By Isqil Najim
The trial of former Minister of Labour and Employment, Chris Ngige, before Justice M.A. Hassan of the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Gwarinpa, Abuja, is drawing attention to how procurement decisions are made and unmade inside government agencies.
While the matter is still before the court. What this analysis does is use the testimonies already given by the prosecution’s own witnesses to explain the procurement law itself, the powers it gives, and the limits it places on everyone, whether minister, permanent secretary or agency head.
On July 3, Dr Maduka Onwusoro, now a Permanent Secretary and formerly Director of Procurement in the Labour Ministry from 2019 to 2023, told the court that there was no undue influence or interference by Ngige during the twelve month period that NSITF’s procurement process was domiciled in the ministry, between 2021 and 2022.
he explained that the procurement activities of both the Parastatals Tenders Board and the Ministerial Tenders Board were carried out with due process.
He confirmed under cross examination that approval annotations on an exhibit tendered in court were his, and that companies recommended and approved were selected on merit.
This testimony from an EFCC witness, effectively favourable to the defence, does not change the underlying procurement law questions the case has raised. It changes the factual dispute over whether the process was actually followed properly in practice. The law itself, and what it demands of public officials, remains the same regardless of how the facts are eventually resolved.
Agencies and ministries are separate bodies under the law
The Public Procurement Act 2007 does not treat a ministry and the agencies under it as one and the same. NSITF is what the Act calls a procuring entity in its own right, just as the ministry supervising it is also a procuring entity in its own right. Each has its own budget, its own appropriation from the National Assembly and its own procurement department answerable to its own accounting officer.
This is why the Act, under the sections covering procuring entities, lists ministries, extra ministerial offices, parastatals and agencies separately. The implication is that a ministry does not automatically have the legal power to absorb or take over the procurement department of an agency under it, no matter how senior the supervising relationship is. Supervision is one thing. Ownership of another entity’s statutory department is another thing entirely.
Tenders boards exist for a reason
The law set up two different boards for a reason. There is the Parastatals Tenders Board for agencies like NSITF, and there is the Ministerial Tenders Board for ministries. Contracts above a certain threshold in an agency are referred upward to the ministry’s board. That referral system is the proper channel recognised by law. What it does not permit is for a ministry to simply step in and run an agency’s procurement department from inside, because that defeats the whole purpose of having two separate boards with two separate thresholds in the first place.
The July 3 testimony actually reinforces this structure rather than undermining it. The witness described a working relationship where the Parastatals Tenders Board and the Ministerial Tenders Board each played their roles, with a deputy officer deployed to NSITF to manage bid collation before forwarding to both boards for approval. If accurate, that account describes a system operating within its lawful channels, not one bypassing them.
Documentation still matters
Under the procurement law, the accounting officer of any agency is personally responsible for what happens with that agency’s procurement, whether the action was carried out directly or by someone under their authority.
This is why documentation matters so much in procurement disputes. A verbal instruction, even one said to come from a high office, does not remove that personal responsibility from the accounting officer.
Where a directive changes how procurement is run, the law expects it to be documented properly and tendered through the right process. The defence’s attempt to tender documents said to contain presidential approvals was withdrawn after the prosecution raised objections over certification, in line with a prior Supreme Court ruling on how documents must be certified before they can be admitted as evidence.
The law treats procurement interference as a serious offence
The Public Procurement Act is not a set of administrative guidelines that agencies can follow loosely. It carries criminal consequences. Altering procurement processes, bypassing established structures, or interfering with how contracts are awarded all attract penalties that can include imprisonment upon conviction. This is the seriousness that anchors the EFCC’s case, whatever direction the evidence eventually points.
Lessons from the case so far
For public officials, particularly ministers and heads of agencies, the lesson remains that supervisory authority over an agency does not translate into ownership of that agency’s internal departments. Any directive given must follow the procedure laid down in procurement law, and it must be in writing.
For procurement officers and professionals, the lesson is that statutory duty as defined by law cannot be taken away by an oral instruction, no matter how senior the source. Where any attempt is made to shift or alter a department’s functions, the law expects that to be documented properly, because when a matter ends up in court or before an anti corruption agency, what will matter is the written record and not what anybody claims was said.
Whichever way this case eventually goes, it remains a useful reminder that Nigeria’s procurement law was deliberately built with checks that no single office, however powerful, can override without consequence.
The trial has been adjourned to October 14, 2026, for further hearing.